Van Bouwel, ed. 2009. The Social Sciences and Democracy by Thoma, Johanna
BOOK REVIEWS 
Theoria 74 (2012): 245-251 
247
ticularly it is not clear what is required to test a theory “severely enough”. In fact, sub-
jective decisions about cutoff values for error probabilities and distances of alterna-
tives from the H0 are required, and one can wonder whether calling a theory “severely 
tested” is as objective as MS imply. Mayo’s response concerns the dependence of such 
decisions on a “cost of errors”, which she calls a “policy or management issue”.  
 A major quality of the book not shared by many philosophical accounts of such is-
sues is the statistical competence of MS backed up by the rich data analytic experience 
of Cox and Spanos. Mayo’s logical elaborations are sharp and convincing. In various 
places she rises metaphilosophical issues beyond standard ESP issues, e.g., the role of 
counterexamples in the philosophy of science. Spanos is well readable, though some-
what repetitive at times.  
 My personal concern with ESP is that its proponents seem to be overoptimistic 
about what it can achieve. I find myself in broad agreement with MS regarding the 
practical statistical implications, but less so with their philosophical interpretation. MS 
are somewhat ambiguous regarding the “truth” of models. One one hand, they are 
obviously aware that all probability models are idealisations. On the other hand, they 
often argue as if there is a true model, which can be more or less reliably approximat-
ed using the proposed modelling/misspecification routines.  
 MS suggest that models should be tested severely against model misspecification, 
but there are no examples in which severity calculations are actually carried out for 
model misspecification tests. Such calculations may often not be possible, and para-
metric inference may still fail if misspecification tests pass the model. To be fair, MS 
are aware of these issues.  
 Compared with some of the other contributors and other philosophers of science I 
have read on similar issues, particularly Mayo is laudably sceptical and modest about 
what theory testing can achieve. Still I believe that the merits of ESP could be better 
explained in pragmatist terms than in terms of “objective truth”. The Bayesian per-
spective is heavily criticised in the book and it is a pity that there is no contribution by 
a modern Bayesian statistician. Overall, this is a very valuable and thought-provoking 
book which makes a strong case in favour of ESP.  
Christian Hennig 
University College London 
chrish@stats.ucl.ac.uk 
JEROEN VAN BOUWEL, ed. 2009. The Social Sciences and Democracy. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
The idea behind The Social Sciences and Democracy is an exciting one: Pulling together 
scholars from philosophy of science, the social studies of science and historians of 
thought to explore the myriad of ways in which democracy and the social sciences are 
related. The connections drawn range from the analysis of groups of scientists as 
democratic communities, to the question of what role social scientists should play in a 
democratic society, on to how social scientific research can inform our normative 
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thinking about democracy. The editor’s introduction to the volume suggests that the 
aim of this interdisciplinary project is to bridge the gap between the epistemic and the 
political. The individual contributions in fact do a very good job at bridging this gap. 
Reading through the volume, however, the real gulfs that remain are the disciplinary 
ones. Not only do the different authors address different questions within this broad 
field, they also tackle them in very different ways. The result is a volume which has a 
lot of variety to offer, with the best contributions containing interesting case studies 
and exciting explorations in the history of thought, but which lacks a common thread 
and delves into more debates than it can even begin to settle.  
 Part I of the volume is probably the most coherent and concerns the question of 
how to deal with the epistemic asymmetry between (social scientific) experts and the 
general public in a democratic society: What role should experts play in democratic 
decision-making? In the editor’s introduction, three traditional positions are outlined, 
namely epistocracy, where experts can shape political decisions directly, technocracy, 
where scientists assist with and inform democratic decisions and their implementation, 
and democracy, where scientists are in a ‘dialogue’, and on equal footing with the pub-
lic. The three articles in this part do much to clarify these traditional positions, but fall 
short of making a significant advance on them.  
 Baert, Jerónimo and Shipman give an informative account of the technocratic 
model and its history, and go on to argue that technocracy should be engaged in dia-
logue with democratic society, an idea which unfortunately remains rather vague. Spe-
cial concern for the social sciences shows mostly in their highlighting how sociology 
of science points to the need for engagement of the public in science, for instance in 
questions of risk evaluation. Here their conclusions, informed by the social studies of 
science, align well with the philosophical literature on fact-value entanglement, a con-
nection which it would be worth exploring more: In how far is the technocratic model 
incompatible with fact-value entanglement? 
 Solomon offers a very clear exposition of the political biases and epistemic prob-
lems that can arise when scientists have a monopoly over expertise and influence 
democratic decisions. She argues, however, that the call to democratise expertise 
which is often voiced in response is “philosophically incoherent” (p. 41). The reason 
lies in the nature of expertise: “The relationship between experts and laypersons is in-
herently neither egalitarian nor inclusive, but rather hierarchical and exclusive” (p. 49). 
Instead, the debate should revolve around where the proper line should be drawn be-
tween experts and laypersons, and whether expertise can be found outside the con-
fines of ‘science’. While Solomon surely helps to clarify what is at stake, her approach 
appears to be less a genuine refocusing of the debate than a more coherent rephrasing 
of an old problem. 
 Rolin defends Longino’s social epistemology against what she calls the “paradox of 
outside criticism” (p. 63): While Longino claims that scientific communities should be 
open to outside criticism, it may be thought that criticism can only be effective when 
it is inside criticism, because standards of argumentation need to be shared in order 
for criticism to be effective. Rolin resolves this problem by redefining a scientific 
community more narrowly as sharing an object of inquiry, and not merely standards 
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of argumentation, which then allows for effective ‘outside’ criticism. One is left won-
dering whether we are dealing with a genuine philosophical problem when it can be 
solved by introducing a distinction and defining terms more clearly. Furthermore, 
Rolin suggest that she is introducing a stakeholder theory of knowledge, but what she 
offers is largely a commentary on Longino which makes no substantial reference to 
stakeholders. 
 Bohman’s paper opens the second part of the volume, which explores what social 
science can do for the practice and theory of democracy. His starting point is social 
science as praxeology: a science which aims at realising norms and ideals, but which is 
nevertheless pragmatic in taking social facts, and their possible entrenchment serious-
ly. Apart from offering an insightful introduction of this idea, situating it its historical 
and intellectual context, Bohman explores what such a pragmatic social science has to 
offer for democracy today, providing very interesting and topical case studies.  
 Kincaid takes seriously the idea of fact-value entanglement in science and explores 
its implications for social science and democracy. He looks at normative democratic 
theory, the social scientific study of democracy, and naturalised philosophy of science 
and argues that the right lessons have not been learnt. In social science, value assump-
tions are usually not made explicit. In naturalised philosophy of science, a very ideal-
ised conception of democracy is commonly applied to the community of scientists. 
And normative democratic theory is inconsistent with social facts. While Kincaid’s 
theses are refreshingly bold and the paper is very well argued, his analysis, especially of 
normative democratic theory, lacks nuance at times. It is by no means obvious in 
which way social facts about real, current day, morally imperfect societies are relevant 
to normative theories of democracy, and Kincaid does not offer enough discussion of 
what kinds of factual assumptions are essential to these theories.  
 Part III shifts the focus away from democracy in society at large and to a demo-
cratic interpretation of scientific practice itself. The first paper, written by the editor, 
questions the ideal of consensus in politics as well as in science, and promotes the idea 
that dissent is valuable. The idea that social power is ineradicable and always presents 
an act of exclusion motivates a view called Agonistic Pluralism. The position is inter-
esting in its rejection of even the kind of meta-consensus one finds in liberal demo-
cratic theories such as Rawls’: in contrast to other theories of pluralism in society and 
in science, Agonistic Pluralism argues that “consensus on pluralism eventually denies 
pluralism” (p. 125). 
 Bouvier’s contribution applies contractualist conceptions of democracy, as well as 
the ideas of positive and negative liberty to science. One of the central questions for 
Bouvier is whether scientific consensus can be seen as an expression of positive liber-
ty, just like joint commitments in Gilbert’s contractualist theory. Using the wonderful-
ly narrated story of the Copenhagen group of quantum mechanics and the personal 
cult around Niels Bohr as an example, he argues that consensus in science is often 
forced. Consequently, the more appropriate notion of democracy to apply to science 
is one of negative liberty as the absence of coercion.  
 Part IV takes us to the democratic governance of social science, and surprisingly 
close to the theme of part I. Turner explores the tension between democracy on the 
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one hand, and sociology as a publicly funded science studying questions of public in-
terest on the other. Doesn’t majority rule only make sense when the state remains 
neutral and has no influence on public opinion? But public funding of sociology may 
jeopardise the state’s neutrality. Turner offers an excellent exposition of these prob-
lems, and a somewhat less satisfying solution. He gives a brief introduction to Bu-
rawoy’s Public Sociology, where sociology can profess advocacy scholarship and the 
state maintains its neutrality by supporting a variety of viewpoints, while “improving 
the quality of public discussion through the subsidisation of opinion diversity.” (p. 
176). After Turner himself noted that sociology as a whole has gone left while public 
opinion went right, it is surprising that he does not problematise the possible lack of 
diversity in sociological research. 
 Weber provides a rigorous analysis of Kitcher’s proposals for a democratic science 
policy, as well as a proposal to modify it. According to Kitcher, science should aim for 
both practically and epistemically significant truths, where what is significant depends 
on the values of the community. While agreeing so far, Weber does not think this war-
rants that all decisions regarding the funding of science should be made in a democrat-
ic way (by public representatives receiving advice from scientific experts). In particu-
lar, he thinks that scientists should be the ones deciding over the use of funds that 
have been (democratically) allocated to research with merely epistemic significance. 
Weber gives two arguments for this claim, both of which are not entirely convincing. 
The first, labelled “subsidiarity” (p. 187), assumes that in much of theoretical science, 
only scientists benefit epistemically from their discoveries, because only they under-
stand and appreciate them. Hence they should decide themselves what to investigate. 
Weber’s assumptions about theoretical science are debatable, but if they were true, 
this would seriously put into question why significant public funds should be delegat-
ed to theoretical research at all, in which case it is fairly insignificant who decides over 
these funds. Weber’s second argument, labelled “serendipity” (p. 188), claims that un-
foreseen practically significant discoveries are often made in the course of theoretical 
research. When serendipitous practical discoveries are the goal, the only criteria that 
apply are methodological, and hence decisions are better made by scientists. However, 
firstly, it is highly contested whether truly serendipitous discoveries are frequently 
made, and secondly, even if they are, whether this is the best way to get at practically 
significant truths. If not, there would be little reason to let funding decisions be guided 
by the possibility of serendipitous results. Furthermore, even if we were to aim for 
serendipitous discoveries, it is unclear why decisions could not be made by public rep-
resentatives under the advice of scientists – just like with all other practically signifi-
cant research.  
 Mirowski recounts the history of what he dubs the 3E school (the new evolution-
ary economic epistemologists) in the economics of science. The moral of his story is 
that much of what economists have said about science ends up supporting the neolib-
eral privatisation of science. In this way the economics of science stands in the way of 
its democratisation. According to Mirowski, this is partly explained by a lack of en-
gagement with the content of science, and the overidealisation of economic models: 
“Economists with their little two-person games and static optimisation exercises now 
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blithely pronounce on what should happen to ‘Science’ in the twenty-first century in 
the United States and the world without shame, pity, competence or any sense of re-
flexivity” (p. 213). While this message is clear in the end, Mirowski’s argument is hard 
to follow at times. 
 Remedios’ contribution is placed between Mirowski and Fuller, opening the last 
part on obstacles to democracy and the social sciences. It compares their respective 
views on the commercialisation of science, giving a nice summary and in fact making 
much of what they are saying clearer. Fuller’s concluding paper traces the history of 
the concept of humanity as the subject of social science. A focus on humanity, accord-
ing to Fuller, is what makes the social sciences different from both the humanities and 
the natural sciences. It implies a special treatment of humans as opposed to other pos-
sible objects of study, and an equal treatment of all humans. Fuller’s explorations are 
very wide-ranging, from Duns Scotus to modern day threats to the idea. He concludes 
with a plea that humanity, and with it social science as a discipline, is worth defending. 
Surprisingly in the context of this volume, humanity is discussed mostly as an ethical 
ideal, and the consequences of its adoption for the practice of (social) science and de-
mocracy are little explored. 
 There is something in this volume for anyone interested in the social sciences and 
their place in a democratic society. The volume in its entirety gives a nice impression 
of the diversity of the work being done in the field. However, since the quality, as well 
as the subject matter and the approach of the individual contributions varies so much, 
I expect that readers will wish to pick and choose depending on their interests and 
backgrounds. 
Johanna Thoma 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
johanna.m.thoma@gmail.com
